autore/author: Ulrike Müßig
pubblicato/published: 4/11/2022
Citazione consigliata/Suggested citation: A. Müßig, Comparative Historical Reasoning on the Fair Trial Guarantee of the ECHR, lceonline (www.lceonline.eu), 3/2022, I, p. 17 ss.
area disciplinare/disciplinary area: storia e teoria del diritto/history and theory of law
parole chiave: giusto processo, comparazione storica, canone medievale ordinabiliter habitum
key words: fair trial, historical comparison, medieval canon ordinabiliter habitum
Summary: 1. Introduction 2. Specific Challenges and Profits of Legal Historical Comparisons 2.1. The Equation of ‘fair’ and ‘legal’ and ‘rational’ in the Medieval Canon ordinabiliter habitum 2.2. Functional Independence vs. Subjection to Instructions 2.3. The Linguistic Congruency of Law and Reason 2.4. More Legal Intellectualism, more Justice 3. Interpreting the Convention and its Art. 6 according to the Legal Historical Findings 3.1. What does ‘established by law’ in Art. 6 ECHR mean? 3.2. What does ‘Tribunal’ in Art. 6 ECHR mean? 4. Conclusion
Abstract
L’indipendenza giudiziale e il diritto della parte ad avere un giudice corretto e giuridicamente competente sono i pilastri della concezione europea della giustizia. Al centro di quest’ultima si trova l’equazione tra “giusto” e “legale” e l’equazione tra “legale” e “razionale” fin dal diritto processuale canonico. La specifica fiducia europea nella certezza del diritto deriva dall’eredità storica dell’indipendenza funzionale del giudiziario nel continente, integrata dalla congruenza linguistica inglese di Law and Reason (Legge e Ragione) durante le lotte costituzionali contro l’assolutismo degli Stuart.
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Judicial independence, and the promise of a party’s right to the correct, legally competent judge, are the mainstays of European conceptions of justice. At the latter’s heart lies the equation of ‘fair’ and ‘legal’ and the equation of ‘legal’ and ‘rational’ since the medieval canon procedural code. The specific European trust in legal certainty results from the historical provenance of the judiciary functional independence on the continent, to be complemented by the English linguistic congruency of Law and Reason during the constitutional struggles with Stuart absolutism.
